Australian Immigration Daily News

This is a case of of a subclass 457 dependant visa.  Below is the DIBP's grant letter which in our view, leaves the DIBP wide open to fraud.

457-dependant-grant-letter-invites-fraud.pdf

On the above 457 visa grant letter, at the bottom of the page, information identifies the unique ID for the sponsoring business.  This is supposed to be confidential to the business.  The sponsoring business' TRN and Visa Application IDs are also visible.  We have deleted this information from the picture to protect the client and our source.  

How would the fraud work?

It is possible that 457 grant notices like this could be sold or shared online.  Sponsoring Australian companies could be totally in the dark, and unaware that fresh nominations and corresponding 457 visa applications are being lodged under their company's approval IDs, and these same companies could have zero knowledge that they are employing and sponsoring people on 457s.

All a fraudster needs to do is log on and lodge a fresh nomination and 457 application with the company IDs provided on grant notice like the one above.  

Someone desperate for a 457 visa, could easily knock up a job description and genuineness statement.  The only pieces of information a fraudster would need on top of this data could easily be found online.

Gathering this data would be even easier for a fraudster if it was a larger Australian company or a publicly listed company, where financials and other information can easily be found online. After all, there are parts of the application form which require information such as the the ABN, the ACN and the business address. All of this can also be found online.

Our suggestion:  Visa grant letters should not contain the sponsoring company's vital immigration identifiers.  In our view it is a breach of the company's privacy and leaves the sponsoring business wide open.