The scammers apparently insist on immediate payment for ‘an alleged error committed by the intended victim” notes a DIBP spokesperson. Somehow, the scammer would authenticate their ‘authority’ by referring to the individuals personal details including date of birth and passport number and warn of errors in their personal information/circumstances like date of birth and require an immediate payment to fix those errors for a fee. The threat is that if payment is not made, the visa holder would be deported.
With email scams, the email address uses a government address but ends in .pn. For example, This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. or This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .
Apparently, the scam starts off with the scammers obtaining peoples personal details via fake job advertisements. This would be followed up with emails or phone-calls demanding money transfers through Western Union.
In another variation of the scam, DIBP warns that some people have been notified in an email signed by a ‘Hon. Thomas Smith’ that they have been selected in a ‘resettlement programme’ through an ‘electronic ballot’.
DIBPs warning is simple:“We do not request payments over the phone or through international money transfer providers.”
Many Australian companies provide detailed personal information of their Australian customers to call centres in India and other countries and some of these call centre employees sell some of that information to scammers and some use it to scam innocent unsuspecting Australiam through the Western Union
Fro Wikipedia:
In May 2007 it was reported[25] that the company's online UK visa application system was flawed. It was also reported that the security flaw had affected online applications from India, Nigeria and Russia. The VFS site was immediately shut down after the technical problem was brought to the attention of the UK media[26] and an independent government investigation was launched[27] by the British Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO). The security breach was first reported by an Indian applicant[28] in December 2005 after which no effective remedial action was taken by either VFS nor UKvisas, the joint Home Office and Foreign & Commonwealth Office unit which runs the UK's visa service through British diplomatic posts overseas. The same applicant went public in May 2007 after he noticed that his earlier warnings were ignored. It is estimated that this security breach had resulted in approximately 50,000 applicants' identities having been possibly compromised until its May 2007 closure, following the media outcry.
The report[29][30][31] of the investigation by the Independent Investigator, Linda Costelloe Baker highlighted organisational failures by both VFS and UKvisas. The report also recommended that the VFS online visa applications not be resumed for applications from India. This has since been replaced by the secure online applications made available directly at the Visa4UK official government website of the UK Border Agency.
Baker also mentioned in the report[32] that following this incident, UKvisas conducted extensive testing and found no evidence that data had been stolen or misused. VFS underestimated what was necessary in order to protect personal data to the levels expected by the UK Data Protections Act. After this incident, several visa application level checks were put in place. Technical processes were also upgraded later to check the records of the online application site.
Ethical and conflict of interest issues related to outsourcing border control to private companies also exist. The UK government has come under fierce criticism for its recent handling of visas, citing welfare and benefits use as the cause,[33] while simultaneously paying taxpayer funds to outsourcing companies based in other countries to handle those same visas. There could also be issues with the protection of citizens due to the fact that private companies can deny services and entry to premises, giving those citizens little opportunity to defend themselves. When visiting a vfs global site, you may not record the session.[34] Whatever goes on there is lost in the mists of time, giving little legal recourse for those unfairly treated.
In November 2007, the UK Information Commissioner's Office announced that it had found the Foreign Office in breach of its obligations under the Data Protection Act 1998. The Information Commissioner's Office required the Foreign Office to sign a statement[35] that it would comply with the Data Protection Act and would not reopen the VFS UK visa online facility. It has been reported by The Guardian[36] that as a result of this ruling, the Foreign Office would review its relationship with VFS and seek to significantly reduce its outsourced work, especially in the area of IT. Consequently, applicants from India today need to apply directly at the Visa4UK official government website for online visa applications.
After the report was issued, VFS introduced various measures to ensure safe and secure business environment. One of them was to make all its centres ISO compliant.[3]
However, since this incident several governments have been critical of VFS Global's abilities and have raised concerns over security.[37] "There's the accountability issue, the privacy issue and why are we outsourcing to a for-profit entity something that belongs in the security mandate?" asked Victor Wong, executive director of the Chinese Canadian National Council. Liam Clifford of global visas, a migration advice company, told The Sunday Telegraph: "Once you put this work in the hands of private companies overseas, you no longer have the same protection."
The controversy over information disclosure was particularly difficult for the British Government which was still recovering from the NHS Medical Training Application Service scandal, an online service that had to be suspended[38] following reports of a similar security breach.[39]
In June 2014, it was reported that VFS Global is being investigated by the South African Competition Commission regarding allegations of market dominance by VFS Global in the visa support services market to foreign embassies. The Commission's spokesperson Themba Mathebula stated that the commission’s screening unit had completed its preliminary investigation and submitted its report, recommending further formal investigations into VFS. [40]
There you go - the perennial issue of data protection in dangerous times... Thanks Westly. I'm pretty sure that the powers that be may already be on it (whether VFS or something else). I believe there needs to be more proactivity from us as practitioners about this issue - people are paying tens of thousands of dollars for a service which is unpredictable at best (in terms of timing, contact, and progress) and where the 'reverence' and the importance of following instructions afforded to government institution in most cultures is high so instructions are not readily questioned but quickly action (thus the success of the scam...) So, what actions and/or questions CAN WE progress as MA (if any)?
I just received the call today to which I laughed and hanged up. The called had Indian accent and I was targeted due to my name.
I guess they are just calling people with ethnic background and trying to get any payment from anyone. I migrated 16 years ago so I am guessing it is not leaked information from any department but targeting people who have ethnic names and checking if they can get to full them. I might be wrong though... With many services being outsourced by DIBP I would not be surprised to find out someone wanted to earn extra cash and sold the information. VFS cannot be trusted.
I have a question - well a few... how do these scammers KNOW who is a visa applicant? could case officer's emails (which would contain A LOT of info about a LOT of people whose visas are being processed) been hacked somehow? Has the Department been proactive in advising its customers that this may be the case? Have they put posters warning of the scam around its shopfront windows to alert people? After all, people is THEIR business. Maybe this is something we can proavtively do as MA members - advising our cients and our significant stakeholders about the scam through our respective websites and generally, which is a good thing to do...
Somewhow I can't help but wonder whether the DIBP Megadata/metadata/whatever has been compromised... very worryng and quite probable... other than individual client's emails being hacked, the source could probably be DIBP (Oz, O/seas posts, those pesky in betweeners who collect applications on behalf of DIBP o/seas...) inadvertently, of course...